I turn complex problems into clear decisions.

As Academic Program Coordinator at IBT, I owned student-outcome analysis across 50+ IB subjects. I'd also tutored four of them myself, including Spanish, where I was the company's first tutor.

The signal came from Spanish, a subject I know deeply, so weak results there didn't sit right. I pulled the outcome data across cohorts and found the same shape in the language subjects: the problem tracked with tutor-to-student ratios, not student ability. Spanish and French were carrying around 8.5 students per tutor against roughly 4 elsewhere. I wrote it up for management with a specific fix: reallocate two tutors to the stretched language subjects, refresh their materials, and add subject-specific tutor guides.

Management implemented the changes. For that same cohort, top-band (band 7) attainment across Spanish and French rose from 27% at their mid-year trial exams to 59% at their November finals, and the share finishing at band 5 or below fell from about a third to roughly one in ten. The one-off analysis became a recurring, program-wide data-review process.

It's how I work everywhere: notice what doesn't fit, ask why before deciding what to do, and let the data point to the real lever, then hand back something a team can act on.

At ANZ I resolved small-business client cases in a regulated banking environment, where every resolution has to be correct, compliant, and defensible on audit. Four months in, KPI targets rose from a 30-case daily benchmark toward 45+. The volume wasn't the real problem — the real cost was the time each case took, because the policy and process knowledge needed to resolve them lived in people's heads and across scattered sources.

I treated it as an analysis problem before a speed problem. I mapped where handling time actually went, then built a working reference set of policy and process notes, a single, structured source that standardised how complex scenarios got resolved and sharpened which cases to prioritise. I kept the documentation audit-ready and engaged cross-functional stakeholders to align on compliant resolutions, so the reference set held up under governance, not just at my own desk.

Per-case handling time fell and throughput rose to 45+ cases a day, peaking at 60, roughly a 50% increase on the original benchmark, while I held one of the lowest case-escalation rates on the team and sustained accuracy as volume climbed. The reference set became shared infrastructure: structured documentation that supported knowledge transfer across the team, not a personal shortcut.

This is the PMO half of how I work. Finding the real lever is step one; the value is in turning it into a repeatable system with the governance, documentation, and stakeholder alignment that lets other people rely on it. Process improvement that survives an audit and outlives the person who built it.

Two linked reports for the Board of Directors of ABC Pty Ltd, written for BUSM4417 (Project Financial Management & Appraisal) and BUSM1276 (Evaluating and Managing Project Risk), on a Build-Operate-Transfer water-treatment facility: $85M capex, a 20-year concession, financed 75% debt at 12% against 25% equity, with revenue locked in through three offtake contracts.

Built the full 20-year financial model in Excel first, cash flows, loan amortisation, NPV, project and equity IRR, WACC, CAPM, DSCR, and interest cover, then wrote a second report that used that same model as the thing to attack. I ran a 10,000-iteration Monte Carlo simulation on revenue and cost assumptions and stress-tested the base case across five risk categories, pairing each with a specific mitigation: EPC contract caps, take-or-pay clauses, debt sculpting, and reserve accounts.

The base case looked bankable: positive NPV, project IRR above WACC, equity IRR above the CAPM-required return, average DSCR of 6.24. The stress test told a less comfortable story, mean NPV under plausible revenue and cost variation fell to roughly -$1.16M, with debt coverage tightest in the early operating years. I recommended the board proceed, but only alongside active early-year monitoring and the mitigation set the risk assessment specified.

Board-level appraisal isn't finished when the base case is positive. It's finished when someone has tried to break the model and reported honestly on what it takes to do that, exactly what I'd bring to a business case or investment paper.

An individual 4,100-word report for BUSM2654 (Public Sector Project Management) comparing PM maturity across Australia's three government tiers, paired with group work benchmarking Melbourne's myki contactless-ticketing modernisation against the global leaders, using an Investment Logic Map, benefits-realisation framing, and PRINCE2, and drawing on the Victorian Auditor-General's 2026 findings.

Assessed six organisations against a P3M3-style maturity lens (ATO vs. NDIA at federal, Transport for NSW vs. Victoria's DTP at state, two councils at local), then built the Investment Logic Map for the $1.96B, 15-year myki contract, mapping drivers, problems, benefits and required changes against VAGO's audit of why known delivery risk was accepted at contract signing instead of resolved.

DTP ran an effective strategy and tender process but didn't resolve known schedule risk before awarding the contract, producing an 18-month standstill and a $136.8M cost increase. Contactless ticketing wasn't the problem, London proved it in 2012 and Sydney staged it from 2017. The failure was governance: documented risk that was never converted into a binding decision at the point that mattered.

This is the version of governance analysis I'd bring to a delivery-PMO role: don't accept an optimistic schedule at contract award, and know how to find the exact point where structure stopped producing control.

A ~2,870-word consultancy management report for BUSM1278 (Project Management Practice) on the Woody 2010 case: a custom woodworking company's $17M capacity expansion that collapsed into cost overruns, schedule slippage, and unresolved supplier disputes.

Applied a PMBOK 6th-edition diagnostic across the full delivery lifecycle, PM authority, stakeholder and communications management, scope, cost, schedule, and project close-out, tracing each failure back to its root governance gap and pairing it with a specific fix: a formal scope statement and change-control board, a communications matrix by audience and frequency, earned-value tracking, and a mandated close-out checklist.

The project hadn't failed from one bad decision, it had never had the basic controls to fail well: no charter, no work breakdown structure, no cost or schedule baseline, no stakeholder register, no close-out review. I delivered a full set of recommendations to rebuild those controls before the next capital project, not after the next failure.

This is the PMBOK toolkit applied end to end rather than module by module, the same lens I'd use to diagnose a struggling program: work backward from the symptom to the missing control, and give the fix an owner.

A 13,200-word group investigation for BUSM4415 (Industry Project Investigation) into stakeholder engagement on the $1.6B Caulfield to Dandenong Level Crossing Removal Project, focused on construction disruption for traders in Noble Park's Douglas & Ian Street precinct between 2016 and 2018.

Ran a qualitative, triangulated desk case study against one sharp research question, did engagement genuinely shape how disruption was managed, or mainly justify decisions already made, drawing on the VAGO audit, the EY Sweeney pre-construction sentiment survey of 144 traders, and the Area 2 and 3 Stakeholder Liaison Group summaries.

Found four linked weaknesses: high engagement activity but only 17% pre-construction awareness among rail users, engagement front-loaded before construction and weakest during the disruption itself, no measurement of commercial impact on traders, and community-outcome accountability split from authority over delivery decisions. The clearest evidence of what was left unresolved: a $3.5M trader revitalisation package committed three years after completion. We delivered five recommendations, including an outcome-oriented evaluation framework and a unified cross-agency Community Outcomes Director role.

Engagement is easy to measure by activity count and easy to get wrong that way. I know how to separate genuine influence on decisions from documentation of decisions already made, and to turn that gap into recommendations a delivery authority could actually implement.

A group project for BUSM4764 (Agile Project Management), graded 82/100, applying Agile and Lean to Netflix's in-house content production, where fragmented, stage-based workflows across creative, production and tech teams were driving delayed releases, missed audience trends, and higher cost and rework.

Used value-stream mapping and root-cause and bottleneck analysis to locate where the fragmentation actually lived, sequential handoffs, low visibility, and reactive late-stage decisions, then designed the fix: a shared Scrum cadence across creative, production and tech with regular reviews to surface issues earlier, supported by Lean and Kanban for waste elimination and real-time flow visibility.

A staged implementation roadmap, pilot one production team, establish sprints and retrospectives, bring external studios into shared visibility, then scale across content divisions, with success measured on flow, delivery and collaboration metrics rather than on whether teams were simply "doing Agile." Graded 82/100 (High Distinction), backed by an ICAgile ICP certification I earned in the course.

A delivery methodology only earns its place if it's chosen for the bottleneck it fixes, not applied by default. This is that instinct: find the actual constraint first, then match the framework to it.